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of the Terry doc trine lies in its abuse in 
cases where the state may seek to dignify 
an otherwise invalid investigatory pro-
cedure. The narrow holding in Terry was 
originally intended as justification for 
good faith searches, limited in scope to a 
pat down for weapons in a situation rea-
sonably perceived by the officer as pre-
senting immediate danger. The gist of 
Terry is good-faith preemption of hostile 
citizen reaction to a lawful police stop; 
Terry was not envisioned as applying an 
excuse for bad faith or sloppy police work 
and the "stop and frisk" perceived by the 
Supreme Court was clearly not meant to 
be a habitual law enforcement procedure. 
In Price, the court noted that the officer 
had concededly acted solely on the basis 
of the police broadcast and that he ob-
served nothing in the course of his ap-
proaching the defendant which indicated 
that he might be armed. The court dis-
tinguished Williams v. State, 19 Md.App. 
204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973), where it 
upheld a "stop and frisk"based on a simi-
lar radio alert together with other circum-
stances which were found sufficient to 
give rise to the required reasonable suspi-
cion. Specifically, in Williams, the fact 
that the automobile was parked in the 
same general vicinity only ninety minutes 
after a shooting incident was a specific 
and articulable fact which reasonably war-
ranted the self-protective frisk, whereas in 
Price the court was faced with the ques-
tion whether the police broadcast alone 
would give rise to this suspicion where the 
offense which was the subject of the 
broadcast had occured three weeks earlier 
and in another part of the county. The 
unaccompanied police broadcast was held 
insufficient. 
The rationale underlying Terry goes to 
the legitimate interest of the state in pro-
tecting its law enforcement officers from 
the inherent dangers involved in the con-
ducting of investigations of those 
suspected of possible criminal activities. 
The cases following Terry have been 
forced to apply a balancing test between 
the rights of individuals to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and 
society's interest in protecting its police 
from potential threatened violence when 
such is the case. The difficult question to 
which the court addressed itself in this 
case is whether the frisk can be upheld at 
a suppression hearing where the arresting 
officer has no reason other than the 
broadcast for conducting the frisk and 
where the prosecution is unable to iden-
tify the source of the information bringing 
about the alert. Through a delicate bal-
ancing of the interests outlined in Terry, 
the court has chosen not to expand its 
prior holding in Williams to encompass a 
situation such as that in Price. 
While it might legitimately be sug-
gested that Price almost completely 
deprives police officers of the right to con-
duct protective frisks solely on the basis 
of police radio broadcasts alerting officers 
of armed and dangerous suspects (who are 
identified with certainty), officers in fear 
of their safety may conduct such frisks if 
they can point to any specific and ar-
ticulable facts supporting the broadcast 
(such as in Williams) which reasonably 
leads them to conclude that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot and that the subject of their 
investigation is armed. Furthermore, such 
a frisk based on the broadcast alone will 
be upheld if the facts underlying the radio 
alert are established by the state at the 
suppression hearing. Price, while declin-
ing to extend the former rule, reaffirms 
the self-protective frisk under appropriate 
circumstances and at the same time 
preserves the right of the people to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The narrow holding of Price requires only 
that evidence seized as the result of an ar-
rest made following a productive frisk for 
weapons based solely on the radio broad-
cast must be suppressed both where the 
accuracy underlying the broadcast cannot 
be documented and in the absence of 
other indicia of present danger. 





by John Jeffrey Ross 
To obtain a conviction of a defendant 
accused of grand larceny in the District of 
Columbia, the Government must present 
evidence that the property stolen was 
worth at least $100.00. (See 22 D.C. 
Code Sec. 2201). Such evidence should 
include proof of the fair market value of 
the item. This axiom appears to be too 
simple to require judicial explanation, but 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
recently reversed a felony grand larceny 
conviction because of the Government's 
failure to establish the threshold value. 
Williams v. United States, 376 A.2d 442 
(D.C. App. 1977). 
John Williams was convicted of grand 
larceny after the Government convinced 
the jury that he had taken a television set 
(and other effects of negligible value). The 
evidence showed that Mr. Williams sold 
the television for $50.00 and then bought 
it back for $100.00 in the hope of return-
ing it to avoid prosecution. There was 
further testimony by the complaining wit-
ness of the property's original purchase 
value and state of repair. 
Williams subsequently appealed this 
conviction, claiming that the Govern-
ment's evidence was insufficient to dem-
onstrate a felony theft. In remanding the 
case for a misdemeanor disposition the 
Court of Appeals stated that the failure of 
the Government's case was the reliance 
on the evidence of only "a) physical pres-
ence of the items stolen and b) the 
owner's statement of original cost." 376 
A.2d at 443. The Court indicated that the 
"fair market value" is defined as that 
"price at which a willing seller and a will-
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ing buyer will trade." Id. Without this evi-
dence of value, the jury's verdict would 
not be based on articulable objective 
facts. Even though the owner testified she 
originally had paid $750.00 for the prop-
erty and the accused (certainly not a will-
ing buyer) paid $100.00 to repurchase 
the television set, neither purchases were 
indicative of fair market value. 
The Court stated that the only depar-
ture from the strict rule of proof would be 
where the "stolen property (1) had been 
recently purchased at a price well in ex-
cess of $100.00; (2) was in 'mint condi-
tion' at the time of the theft; and (3) was 
not subject to 'prompt depreCiation or ob-
solescence.' " 376 A.2d at 444. 
The government's proof was thus suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction only for petit 
larceny, a misdemeanor. With this charge, 
all that is necessary is for the government 
to show that the stolen items had value. 
The Court closed with an oblique 
reference to what may be poor trial prepa-
ration on the part of the U.S. Attorney's 
Office. It noted, at 376 A.2d 444 n. 3, 
that there has been "a continuing indica-
tion of failure in governmental proof suffi-
cient to establish a felony rather than a 





by John Jeffrey Ross 
On July 13, 1974, a young woman was 
allegedly raped in the District of Colum-
bia. This event provoked a search by her 
relatives and friends for some neighbor-
hood justice. Mrs. Mary Harris, grand-
mother of the assault victim, accompanied 
this crowd of vigilantes to a Washington 
home wherein the rapist was thought to 
reside. As two men from the group forced 
their way through the front door they shot 
down an innocent third party, Louis 
Sisler, who tried to prevent their entry. 
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Sisler died at an emergency room 
shortly thereafter, but not before he pro-
vided, by way of admissible "spontaneous 
utterances," testimony leading to the 
murder and burglary convictions of the 
assailants. See Harris v. United States, 
373 A.2d 590 (D.C. App. 1977). 
The tragiC events of that day have led 
to further prosecutions, and the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals has recently 
adjudicated the appeal of Mrs. Harris from 
her convictions for conspiracy to commit 
assault with a dangerous weapon, at-
tempted first degree burglary while 
armed, and felony murder. Mrs. Harris 
had been brought to justice for her role in 
aiding and abetting the forcible entry of 
the murder victim's home and his shoot-
ing. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34 
(D.C. App. 1977). 
On appeal, Mrs. Harris claimed that the 
trial court erroneously resolved the 
follOWing issues against her: 
'SuffiCiency of the evidence to sustain 
accomplice guilt for attempted first 
degree burglary; 
2statements by the decedent admitted 
against her; 
3sufficiency of the evidence to show ac-
complice guilt for the first degree 
felony murder; 
4refusal by the trial court to impanel, 
sua sponte, a second jury to hear Mrs. 
Harris' untimely insanity defense or to 
conduct a voir dire of the jurors to 
determine prejudice against such a 
defense; 
5prejudical statements by the prosecu-
tor concerning Mrs. Harris' insanity 
defense, even though the trial court 
provided instructions to mitigate their 
impact. 
She further complained that the 
offenses upon which the felony murder ac-
cusation was based should have been 
merged with the homiCide, thus removing 
support for the first degree murder con-
viction. 
The court affirmed the convictions, in-
dicating by a recital of the group's pur-
poseful actions that the evidence, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the 
government, clearly showed criminal 
animus for revenge and armed, forcible 
entry into the victim's home-thus suffi-
cient evidence for attempted first degree 
burglary while armed. [d., at 36-37. Con-
cerning accomplice guilt, the court saw as 
dispositive numerous actions by Mrs. Har-
ris indicative of her role as a motivating 
force in the group's search for revenge 
which led it to the scene. The court re-
jected her claim that her leaving the scene 
prior to the murder was sufficient to avoid 
criminal liability. 
The court reasoned that absent an affir-
mative move to "disavow or defeat" the 
criminal purpose, or "definite decisive" 
steps shOWing complete abandonment of 
the illegal undertaking, the departure was 
ruled insufficient "as a matter of law" to 
show withdrawal from the criminal en-
terprise. Id., at 38. 
As to HarriS' liability in the felony 
murder, the court stated that the killing 
was within the scope of the burglary per-
petrated by Harris and her prinCipals; a 
natural and probable consequence of, and 
not merely "coincident" to, the illegal en-
try. 377 A.2d at 37-38. 
On the failure of the trial court to im-
panel, sua sponte, a second jury to hear 
her insanity defense or to question venire-
men of the present panel to determine 
prejudice against this defense, the court 
stated that Harris had abruptly changed 
her defense tactics at trial by an untimely 
assertion of the insanity defense; there 
was no right to a second jury, and that ab-
sent a timely request by counsel for voir 
dire on the insanity issue, the trial judge 
did not abuse her discretion in the manner 
in which she conducted the trial. Also 
fatal to the appellant's claim was the ab-
sence of objection to the "manner and 
method" of the court's use of the jury. 
In addition, the court dismissed claims 
that the prosecutor made statements of 
such import as to prejudice the defense. It 
was held that proper jury instructions 
remedied their effect, and that a fair trial 
was preserved. 377 A.2d at 39-40. 
The final issue to be considered was 
Mrs. Harris' claim that the felony murder 
conviction must be reversed because the 
offenses on which the felony murder was 
based should have been merged into that 
homicide as lesser included offenses. In 
other words, she contended that 1) the 
burglary was based upon the intent to 
commit assault with a dangerous weapon; 
